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Security review

The physical and cyber security review DOT asks for before the grant agreement is signed

Before a Congestion Relief grant agreement is signed, the recipient must show DOT it has considered and addressed the project's physical and cyber security risks. List the project's equipment, data and practices here to get that document as a PDF in the notice's format. Nothing you enter leaves your browser.

“Each applicant selected for Federal funding must demonstrate, prior to the signing of the grant agreement, effort to consider and address physical and cyber security risks relevant to the transportation mode and type and scale of the project. Projects that have not appropriately considered and addressed physical and cyber security and resilience in their planning, design, and project oversight, as determined by DOT and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, will be required to do so before receiving funds.”

NOFO FHWA-CRPP-27-001, Section H.1, citing National Security Memorandum 22.

The project

Equipment

Count the devices of each kind the project installs or connects to. The service lives are typical planning figures; enter your agency's. Equipment still running on January 19, 2038, when software that keeps time in a signed 32-bit number overflows, needs its vendor's word that it handles later dates.

SystemDevicesService life (years)Dates after January 19, 2038
The risks the document records for each system
Traffic signal and ramp meter controllers
Timing can be changed through the field network, a cabinet's local port or the central system, and default passwords and old firmware are common. A malicious or faulty timing change is a safety risk, so the conflict monitor must stay independent of the controller.
Traffic cameras and video recorders
Cameras are networked computers, often with web interfaces and default passwords, and recorded video can show people and plates. Many cameras are sold under brands other than their maker's, which matters for the covered-equipment ban.
Toll and plate readers
Readers capture plates and transponder IDs, which are personal information. Tampering or failure can lose revenue or bill the wrong driver.
Dynamic message signs
Signs have been taken over to show false messages where default passwords were left in place, and a false message can misdirect drivers.
Vehicle detection (loops, radar, video)
Detection drives signal timing, ramp metering and prices. Data that is spoofed, stops or drifts degrades operations, so the system should notice it.
Field network (switches, radios, fiber)
The network ties field devices to the center. On a flat network one compromised device can reach the rest, so field networks are kept apart from business networks and the internet.
Connected-vehicle roadside units
Roadside units broadcast to vehicles. Messages should be signed with credentials from a security credential management system, so vehicles can trust them.
Traffic management center software
Central control over signals, signs, meters and cameras: a compromise reaches every field device. Accounts, patching and logging matter most here.
Tolling and payment back office
Holds accounts, payment details and trip records. Card data falls under the payment card industry's data security standard (PCI DSS), and outages stop collection.
Traveler information (websites, apps, data feeds)
Faces the internet, so it is the most exposed, and false information can misdirect drivers.
Parking meters and pay stations
Take payments in public places, where card readers can be tampered with.
Hosted and cloud services
Hosting moves part of the risk to the provider. The contract should set the provider's security duties, how soon it reports incidents, and where data is kept.

Data

Tick each kind of data the project's systems collect or hold. The document says how each kind is handled.

Practices

Mark where each practice stands. Planned means in place before the systems go live; anything left open is listed in the document as an item to close. The codes are the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 categories each practice falls under.

Govern

GV.RR
GV.PO
GV.SC

Identify

ID.AM
ID.RA
ID.RA

Protect

PR.AA
PR.AA
PR.IR
PR.PS
PR.DS
PR.AT

Detect

DE.CM
DE.AE

Respond

RS.MA
RS.CO

Recover

RC.RP
PR.IR

Physical security and resilience

PR.AA
PR.IR
ID.RA
PR.IR

Covered equipment

Federal award funds can't buy equipment, services or systems that use covered telecommunications or video surveillance equipment as a substantial or essential component: telecommunications equipment from Huawei or ZTE, and, for public safety, government-facility security, surveillance of critical infrastructure and national security, video surveillance and telecommunications equipment from Hytera, Hikvision or Dahua, including subsidiaries and affiliates (2 CFR 200.216). Cameras and recorders are often sold under other brands, so ask each vendor.

The document

  • To do No equipment listed yet.
  • Open Practices: 0 in place, 0 planned before go-live, 0 not applicable and 22 open, of 22.
  • Open Covered telecommunications and video surveillance equipment (2 CFR 200.216): not yet confirmed.
23 open items
  • A named person is accountable for the project's security, with duties set for the agency, its contractors and its vendors. (GV.RR)
  • The project follows the agency's or State's information security policy. (GV.PO)
  • Contracts require vendors to report vulnerabilities, supply security updates for the equipment's service life, and provide a software bill of materials. (GV.SC)
  • An inventory lists every device and system with its location, network address and software version, and is kept up to date. (ID.AM)
  • A risk assessment of the project's systems is done during design and repeated before they go live. (ID.RA)
  • The equipment is checked against vendor advisories and CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and each problem found is tracked to a fix. (ID.RA)
  • Default passwords are changed on every device, accounts are personal, and remote and administrator access needs multi-factor authentication. (PR.AA)
  • Vendors' remote access is off by default, approved each time it is needed, and logged. (PR.AA)
  • Field devices are on networks kept apart from the agency's business network and the internet, with remote access through one controlled gateway. (PR.IR)
  • Software and firmware are updated on a schedule, and versions the vendor no longer supports are replaced. (PR.PS)
  • Personal and payment data are encrypted when stored and when sent, and kept no longer than the retention policy allows. (PR.DS)
  • Staff and contractors who run the systems are trained in their security procedures. (PR.AT)
  • Network traffic and system logs are watched for unusual activity, including unauthorized changes to signal timing, sign messages or prices. (DE.CM)
  • Detector and sensor data that stops or looks wrong raises an alert before it drives signal timing or prices. (DE.AE)
  • An incident response plan covers the project's systems, names who acts and who is told, and has been rehearsed. (RS.MA)
  • Incidents are reported to the people and agencies that State law and the agency's policy name. (RS.CO)
  • Configurations and data are backed up where an attack on the systems can't reach them, and restoring them has been tested. (RC.RP)
  • Field equipment keeps running safely without the central system: signals on a fixed-time plan or flashing, signs blank, toll points storing transactions until the link returns. (PR.IR)
  • Cabinets and enclosures use locks the agency controls, not the common traffic-cabinet key, and report when opened. (PR.AA)
  • Critical equipment has backup power for the outages the agency plans for. (PR.IR)
  • Equipment siting accounts for flooding, heat, wind and vehicle strikes at each location. (ID.RA)
  • Communications to critical sites have a second path, or the sites run safely without them. (PR.IR)
  • Confirm that no equipment or service bought for the project uses covered telecommunications or video surveillance equipment (2 CFR 200.216).

The PDF follows the notice's format for application files: single-spaced 12-point type with 1-inch margins (Section D.1). It records the applicant's own review, with a sign-off; DOT and the Department of Homeland Security decide whether a project has done enough.